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ABSTRACT 
 
 
The ongoing Brexit process has profound consequences for Northern Ireland within the constitution of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Given the overriding importance of the Irish 
border to the Brexit negotiations, this paper examines the historical and constitutional circumstances 
that led to partition of Ireland in the first place. It goes on to consider the injustices prevalent within 
Northern Ireland prior to and during the ‘Troubles’ era, and the resolution of these issues of 
justice/injustice, via constitutional means, with the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998. Finally, it 
considers how the Brexit process has reopened apparently settled questions on the constitutional status 
of Northern Ireland within the UK, such as the viability of the post-1998 power-sharing institutions and 
the issue of whether a referendum on reunification with a united Ireland should be called. 
 
Introduction  
 
In the 2016 referendum, an overall majority of 51.9% of UK voters agreed to the proposition that the 
UK should ‘Leave’ the European Union. However, the distribution of votes was not equally in favour 
of ‘Brexit’ across the UK regions. Only England and Wales demonstrated majorities in favour of Brexit 
– Scotland and Northern Ireland showed clear majorities for Remain. As a result, the pursuit of Brexit 
has provoked constitutional instability in both ‘Remain’ regions. This chapter focuses on the 
constitutional questions raised by the Brexit vote, and subsequent political decisions about the UK’s 
post-Brexit relationship with the EU, for Northern Ireland. As explored below, the consequences of 
Brexit for Northern Ireland threaten to re-open ‘old wounds’ – issues of justice/injustice that were 
apparently resolved by the 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement. 
 
The June 2016 referendum did not specify a particular form of Brexit. In the aftermath of the vote, 
several options were available, including joining the European Economic Area (EEA) and the European 
Free Trade Area (EFTA). Had the UK government sought a ‘soft Brexit’ by aiming to join both the 
EEA and EFTA then concerns over the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would not have arisen. 
Yet, the UK government instead sought to achieve a ‘hard Brexit’. The post-referendum ‘red lines’ the 
UK government developed in pursuit of this policy include the following key aims: (i) that the UK 
should leave the customs union so to engage in an independent trade policy and negotiate trade deals 
with non-EU countries; and (ii) ending free movement of people, which means, in effect, leaving the 
single market.  
 
These UK ‘red lines’ are of great importance to the island of Ireland. Exiting the single market and 
customs union will mean that the Irish border between Ireland and Northern Ireland will become the 
only external land border between the EU and the UK. The UK, including Northern Ireland, would 
become a ‘third country’ with respect to the EU. As a matter of normal practice, this would necessitate 
the creation of border infrastructure in order to enforce checks on tariffs, regulatory compliance and, 
potentially, free movement of people. For a number of reasons, this poses a serious problem for 
maintenance of the Northern Ireland peace process, and cross-border collaboration between Ireland and 
Northern Ireland. As explained below, for many in Northern Ireland, the border itself is viewed as 
fundamentally unjust and arbitrary. The effective disappearance of the border in practice, which has 
occurred since the 1998 Agreement, but which his underpinned by the legal principles of the EU single 
market, is a great achievement – and one that can only be described as ‘just’. 
 
Yet, the UK government’s aims, and its stated means to address those aims, are inconsistent. For 
instance, the UK government has committed to no new infrastructure at the Irish border. This brings up 
a (potentially unsolvable) quandary: how can Northern Ireland be part of a third country to the EU 
(Ireland), and thus require a range of checks at the Irish border, if no infrastructure to allow such checks 
can be placed at the border? There are no equivalent borders to the EU (e.g. Norway, Switzerland) 
featuring no infrastructure. Moreover, the re-imposition of border infrastructure will certainly be viewed 
through the prism of injustice by many in Northern Ireland – they will argue that Northern Ireland, as a 
region within the UK, did not vote in favour of Brexit for the precise reason that it would inevitably 
cause this profound alteration to their daily lives. 
 
In their attempts to find a solution, the EU and UK issued a Joint Report in December 2017 outlined 
three possible solutions to Irish border question (i) the border issue could be resolved in the framework 
of a future EU-UK trade agreement whereby the UK could, as a starting point, form a customs union 
with the EU; (ii) it could be resolved through specific technical solutions that eliminate the need for 
border infrastructure; (iii) the ‘backstop’ – in the absence of other solutions the UK could commit to 
align itself with EU customs and internal market rules. 
 
The UK has not brought forward tangible and workable technological solutions to the border question. 
As a result, the backstop has emerged as key to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement.  
As part of the backstop, Northern Ireland would become a Common Regulatory Area (CRA) and would 
continue to abide by EU customs laws and EU legislation concerning the free movement of goods. 
Northern Ireland would be in a unique trading position within the UK. If the rest of the UK – Great 
Britain – left the customs union to seek trade deals elsewhere, Northern Ireland would remain under the 
EU customs and regulatory umbrella. The advantage to Northern Ireland of the backstop are: (i) the 
avoidance of infrastructure at the border and (ii) continued participation in the single market for goods, 
as well as more than a dozen related economic areas, which would benefit NI’s agriculture industry and 
other businesses. The backstop, therefore, is an attempt to prevent the injustice that would inevitably be 
caused by a ‘hard border’. Nonetheless, the Democratic Unionist Party, which has 10 MPs at 
Westminster, who are currently in a confidence-and-supply agreement with the government, strongly 
opposes any agreement that would see Northern Ireland classed as a separate territory with respect to 
EU law. At time of writing, this quandary is not resolved. 
 
This chapter proceeds as follows: first, I examine the constitutional history of the Irish border, namely 
the political and legal decisions that led to partition in 1920; second, I examine the history of Northern 
Ireland from 1920 until 1998, including the ‘Troubles’; third, I consider the Good Friday Agreement 
1998; and finally I explore the consequences of the current impasse – the potential for a hard border on 
the island of Ireland and whether a ‘border poll’ – a referendum on reunification – could be called in 
Northern Ireland in the coming years. 
 
How the island of Ireland came to be Partitioned  
 
Partition in the case of the island of Ireland is unique in that it results in both an internal (within the 
UK) separation and, eventually, an external one as first the Irish Free State acquired Dominion status 
(1922), and later full independence as a republic (1937, 1949). Yet, Ireland has only known partition 
since 1920. Prior to that Ireland was governed and administered as whole territory, and was wholly a 
member of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland. So in order to understand Northern Ireland 
as a contested territory, we must first examine how partition came to pass. Furthermore, it is impossible 
to examine the question of partition without noting the legacy of British imperialism and the 
constitutional changes that occurred within the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland during the 
19th and early 20th century.1   
 
During the 19th century, the disadvantageous, and arguably unjust, system that saw Irish MPs taking 
their seats at Westminster rather than in an Irish Parliament in Dublin (as had been the case prior to The 
Acts of Union 1801) led to calls for the creation of a new Irish Parliament - in effect, Irish ‘Home Rule’ 
within the UK - by the Irish Parliamentary Party. Notably, Irish Home Rule was opposed by the key 
constitutional thinker of the day – AV Dicey. Loughlin notes that Dicey’s outright rejection of Home 
Rule for Ireland was rooted in a foundation, not of law, but of sheer power dynamics: ‘from the inherent  
capacity  of  a  strong,  a  flourishing,  a populous,  and  a  wealthy  country  to  control  or  coerce  a  
neighbouring  island  which is  poor,  divided,  and  weak’.2  Notably, for Dicey, the question of what 
was ‘just’ in the situation was irrelevant. 
 
Partition arose as an idea in Ireland in the early 20th century, due to conflict over Irish Home Rule, the 
signature policy supported by the Liberal Party and the Irish Parliamentary Party, headed by John 
Redmond, which became legally achievable only after the constitutional changes made by the 
Parliament Act 1911. It was only with the passing of the 1911 Parliament Act, which reduced the power 
of the (Conservative-dominated) House of Lords to block bills in the House of Commons, that Home 
Rule for Ireland could be enacted by the Liberal-led government. Home Rule emerged at this time as a 
seeming inevitability – eventually leading to the passing of the Irish Home Rule Bill in 1914.  
 
The attempt, via Home Rule, to resolve the longstanding ‘Irish Question’ stirred up a corollary – the 
‘Ulster Question’. Unionists in Ireland, who were mainly Presbyterians or Anglicans located primarily, 
but certainly not exclusively, in the north-eastern counties of Ulster, claimed that ‘Home Rule’ in 
Ireland would be unjust to them as it would amount to nothing less than ‘Rome Rule’. The reason for 
this was that the Home Rule parliament envisaged for Ireland would not be Grattan’s Anglican 
institution (which did not allow Catholic or Presbyterian participation), but, in keeping with changes to 
the British electoral franchise during the 19th century, would be a relatively open, majoritarian one. This 
would, Ulster Unionists feared, entrench a permanent governing majority of parties loyal to Catholicism 
and to Nationalist causes.  
 
From 1912 Ulster Unionist politicians headed by Edward Carson, and encouraged by British 
Conservative politicians, opposed Irish Home Rule with great virulence, both by political means, and 
	
1 K.J. Rankin, ‘Deducing rationales and political tactics in the partitioning of Ireland, 1912-1925’ Political 
Geography 26 (2007) 909-933. 
2 AV  Dicey,  A  Leap  in  the  Dark,  or  Our  New  Constitution  (London:  John  Murray,  1893),  29.  As 
related by M. Loughlin, ‘The  British  Constitution:  Thoughts  on  the Cause  of  the  Present  Discontents’ LSE  
Law,  Society  and  Economy  Working  Papers  2 (2018), 8. 
via the threat of militant violence (the formation and arming of the Ulster Volunteer Force). Ulster 
Unionist politicians opined that Home Rule would, on a majoritarian basis, create an Irish Parliament 
in which the interests of the Protestant-Unionist minority on the island could be subjected to a Catholic-
Nationalist majority. For Unionists, this was perceived as creating the potential for tremendous 
injustices to occur – they did not welcome the idea of becoming a potentially vulnerable minority 
community within a Home Rule system. 
 
It is also relevant that the area around Belfast was by far the most economically important in Ireland – 
it was the centre of the ship-building industry, where famous ocean liners such as The Titanic, were 
built. Ulster Unionists feared that the economic links with Great Britain could suffer if Home Rule were 
enacted – especially if it ended up being a stepping-stone to full independence for Ireland. 
 
It was in this context that the foundational document of Ulster Unionism – the Ulster Covenant - was 
written in 1912. By then Edward Carson had emerged as the leading Unionist Politician, leading the 
Irish Unionist Party. Ulster Unionists began to arm themselves, forming the Ulster Volunteer Force. In 
this they were encouraged by British Conservative politicians, such as Bonar Law, to defend their 
interests against the creation of what Unionists envisaged would be a Catholic-dominated Irish Home 
Rule parliament.3 
 
Before any internal (to Ireland) conflict took place, WWI broke out, and many thousands of Ulster 
Unionists and Irish nationalist supporters of Home Rule enlisted in the British army. Home Rule was 
suspended. By the time WWI had ended, the circumstances of the relationship between Britain and 
Ireland had changed profoundly, both politically and constitutionally. Before the Home Rule Bill could 
be given Royal Assent, WWI broke out. During WWI the 1916 Easter Rising happened, and the Irish 
nationalist mood shifted towards full independence. The 1918 General Election lead to a majority of 
anti-Home Rule, poor-independence Sinn Féin MPs being elected – they refused to take their seats at 
Westminster and instead formed a shadow government in Dublin. 
 
From a political perspective, the 1916 Easter Rising in Dublin, and the subsequent execution of most 
of the principal instigators, radicalised a generation of Irish nationalists. The executions were viewed 
as acts of great injustice – and an Irish political majority turned away from the promise of Home Rule, 
and threw their weight behind the goal of complete independence from Britain; constitutionally, 
changes to the electoral franchise post-WWI increased the electorate in Ireland by two-thirds, and led 
to the election of a substantial majority (73 out of 105) of Irish MPs from Sinn Féin, the pro-
	
3 J. Anderson and L. O’Dowd, ‘Imperialism and nationalism: The Home Rule struggle and border creation in 
Ireland, 1885-1925’ Political Geography 26 (2007) 934-950 
independence and anti-Home Rule party, while also bringing 26 Unionist candidates to power in the 
northern counties.4 When the Home Rule was finally enacted in 1920, it came in the form of the 
Government of Ireland Act 1920, which partitioned Ireland into North and South, with each having its 
own Home Rule parliament. 
 
Partition is a political device that must be accommodated in constitutional terms. It is commonly put 
forward as the solution to the problem of contested territory – of competing nationalisms (British/Irish) 
– and of demography – majority/minority communities (Protestant-Unionist, Catholic-Nationalist).5 
While partition is viewed as a political solution allowing ‘decision-makers to find a way out of 
seemingly intractable political dilemmas’,6 it brings up vital questions for constitutional drafters and 
lawyers: who encompasses the nation that the constitution is proclaimed for? What territory does the 
constitution claim and where does its legal jurisdiction end? Rather than providing a just and 
comprehensive solution to the tensions that arise when territory is contested, partition succeeds only in 
so far as it creates new problems – in Ireland partition inverted the problem of a Protestant-Unionist 
minority on the island, by creating a six county statelet with a Protestant-Unionist majority; over time 
the way this Protestant-Unionist majority was politically engineered (gerrymandering of constituencies; 
discrimination in housing and employment) created injustices that erupted in political violence (The 
Troubles). Therefore, the impact of partition in Ireland was experienced very differently by Unionists 
and Nationalists. For Irish Nationalists, it was viewed as a great injustice – whereas for Unionists it was 
a just and proper reassertion of their role within the UK. Partition did not solve the underlying problem 
of majoritarian nationalism – it merely turned that problem on its head.  
 
The Government of Ireland Act in 1920 therefore paved the way for a settlement based on a 
determination that whatever happened to the remainder of the country, the six counties of what 
thereafter became known as Northern Ireland would remain within the United Kingdom. It is within 
this context that the Treaty between the British negotiators and the Irish nationalist representatives was 
negotiated and agreed in 1921. Yet, evidence suggests that the British did not see partition has being a 
permanent split between nationalists and unionists.7 As Anderson and O’Dowd remark: 
The imperial architects of partition neither intended to separate Ireland from the empire, nor 
Ireland’s unionists and nationalists from each other. The Cabinet Committee saw its ‘six-county 
solution’ as short-term and meant its effects to be minimised as a prelude to restoring the island’s 
unity within the empire, but in this they were largely thwarted by Ulster unionists.8 
	
4 J. Coakley, ‘The Impact of the 1918 Reform Act in Ireland’ Parliamentary History 37 (2018) 118-132. 
5 B. O’Leary, ‘Analysing partition: Definition, classification and explanation’ Political Geography 26 (2007) 
886-908. 
6 T.G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and practice (London: Macmillan, 1984), x. 
7 T.G. Fraser, Partition in Ireland, India and Palestine: Theory and practice (London: Macmillan, 1984). 
8 Anderson and O’Dowd, 945. 
 Despite intentions, partition quickly became permanent – with the tacit acceptance of the Irish Free 
State. Indeed even in the original text of the 1937 Irish Constitution, which cleared the way for the 26 
counties of Ireland to become a republic, the reality of partition was impliedly acknowledged from a 
practical legal perspective, even if a territorial claim on the entire island was still maintained. 
 
Indeed, Northern Ireland from its creation was given exceptional status within UK law – framed by a 
written constitutional statute – the 1920 Act - with a devolved parliament and executive, but crucially 
without any counter-majoritarian checks on these powers. Thus Northern Ireland’s special status, and 
the apparent autonomy of it as an exceptional, contested territory, dates from this constitution-making 
moment (1920-22). The constitutional state of exception created both an ambiguous relationship with 
the central administration (Westminster), which at various times assumed direct rule, and an 
antagonistic relationship with the neighbouring nation state that saw the territory as part of its own 
expansive idea of the nation (Ireland). Rather than facilitating justice, reconciliation and co-existence, 
the special status granted to Northern Ireland actually begat a form of unjust exceptionalism that lead 
to the erosion of constitutional guarantees. At the same time, the exceptional status accorded at the time 
of partition lead to later attempts at resolving tensions via constitutional means, with varying degrees 
of success. 
 
Put simply, the UK created Northern Ireland as a state of exception underpinned by constitutional law.9 
Partition is a question of justice because a substantial portion of the population do not identify with the 
nation-state they are officially a part of. As a result, since 1920 this exceptional province has featured 
frequent campaigns of violent opposition against what are often perceived as ‘occupying forces’ with 
limited or no political legitimacy.  
 
Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom Constitution (1920-1998)  
The Government of Ireland Act 1920 was enacted as the foundational constitutional statute for Northern 
Ireland. Yet, despite the fact that the Act established partition, creating the lawful basis for what was 
then envisaged as Home Rule Parliaments for both Northern Ireland and Southern Ireland, partition was 
not intended at the time to be a permanent fixture of the new established order. Sections 1-3 of the 
Government of Ireland 1920 Act provided for the eventual establishment of a united Home Rule 
parliament for Ireland – showing that partition was envisaged as an impermanent and non-ideal solution. 
However, the idea of a Home Rule Parliament for Southern Ireland met with staunch nationalist 
opposition, and was rejected by Irish nationalist politicians. Instead, a shadow Irish Parliament – the 
first Dáil - continued to operate in Dublin constituted by the 1918 General Election mandate, which 
	
9 C. Schmitt, Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Meaning of Sovereignty (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1985). 
returned a majority of obstructionist Sinn Fein MPs. For this reason, the 1920 Act had significance in 
reality only for the institutions of Northern Ireland. On key aspect of the Act made clear that Executive 
powers largely devolved to the Lord Lieutenant’s (later in 1922, the Governor’s) administration. 
 
Importantly, Northern Ireland’s constitution had few safeguards on majoritarian and executive 
dominance. Yet, Section 5(1) of the Government of Ireland Act 1920 guaranteed freedom of religion 
and appeared to outlaw discrimination on the basis of religion. Despite this, injustice and discrimination 
became endemic – it was particularly apparent in the electoral system. Section 14 of the Government 
of Ireland Act 1920 established proportional representation (P.R.) as the electoral system to be used in 
local government and the parliaments of Northern Ireland (and Southern Ireland), though after a 3 year 
period it enabled the Parliament to change the electoral system. Indeed, following Unionist Party losses 
in the 1925 general election in Northern Ireland, PR was abandoned in favour of FPTP, which proved 
more favourable to the party’s chances in the 1929 election, where it lost vote share, but gained four 
seats. Similarly, PR was quickly abolished for local government elections.10 This can only be viewed 
as unjust – a majority polity changing the electoral rules to better suit its opportunity to entrench 
majoritarianism. 
 
Moreover, the voting system for local elections did not follow the course of mid-century British reforms, 
but rather maintained ‘the property franchise’ which denied votes to those were not property owners, 
and those who paid business rates could further avail of additional votes. These measures primarily 
benefited those who were Unionist/Protestant, creating the conditions for further injustice in the 
administration of local government. 11At the same time, the gerrymandering of constituencies in 
Catholic-majority cities such as Derry and Enniskillen is well documented.12 Moreover, it is clear there 
was some discrimination in the award of local authority housing, and that this was linked to inequalities 
in electoral representation.  
 
The overall provincial Unionist majority, coupled with these inequalities, meant that the Ulster Unionist 
Party was in continuous office at Northern Ireland parliament from 1922-1972. The entrenchment of a 
permanent Unionist majority, no matter what the cost, was the unashamed goal of many Unionist 
politicians. The phrase ‘a Protestant Government for a Protestant people’ – often attributed to Lord 
Craigavon - became commonly known.13 The anomalies between the electoral rules in Great Britain 
	
10 P. Buckland, The Factory of Grievances. Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921-39 (Dublin, Gill & 
Macmillan, 1979). See also Roy Foster, Modern Ireland 1660-1972 (1988). 
11 https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/apr/22/lost-moment-exhibition-northern-ireland-civil-rights-1968-
troubles-what-if  
12 Tbc 
13 TBC 
and those in Northern Ireland were not ended in Northern Ireland until the Electoral Law Amendment 
Act was passed in 1968, while PR was reintroduced for local elections in 1973. 
 
Finally, the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) came to be an overwhelmingly Unionist/Protestant 
institution, with a disproportionately low number of Catholics represented. This lead many in the 
nationalist community to question its legitimacy – a particularly acute problem once ‘The Troubles’ 
began in the late 1960s. 
 
The above examples of injustice are well documented and not in any historical doubt. That in its first 
decades Northern Ireland became a ‘factory of grievances’ is a point that has been long-accepted.14 Paul 
Bew argues that there are shades of grey in this narrative, but even he accepts its overall validity.15  
 
CONSTITUTIONAL ‘EXEMPTIONS’, POLITICAL VIOLENCE, AND PRAETORIAN RULE 
 
Northern Ireland is a contested territory. A place where there is, perhaps, no consensus on what is just 
and what is unjust. Its unique legal arrangements within the UK from 1920 onwards created the 
conditions executive dominance, praetorian rule, and human rights violations. Injustice was particularly 
evident during the thirty-year period known as ‘The Troubles’ (1968-1998).16 I do not intend to conduct 
a detailed analysis of this period. However, it is worth noting a number of key legal points that 
demonstrate Northern Ireland’s unique state of exception, including several cases of injustice that typify 
a wider problem of unjust governance.   
 
The Civil Authorities (Special Powers) Act (Northern Ireland) 1922 was passed by the Parliament of 
Northern Ireland in the context of continued violent unrest following partition. It was extremely 
controversial and provided for security-related quasi-military police action be taken by the Ulster 
Special Constabulary (USC or ‘B Specials’) who were distrusted by the nationalist community. The 
USC were not disbanded until 1970. The Special Powers Act was not repealed until the Northern Ireland 
(Emergency Provisions) Act 1973, enacted under direct rule by the British government.  
 
Key signifiers of the injustices that occurred during ‘The Troubles’ included the following: internment, 
Bloody Sunday, the imposition of direct rule from Westminster, and the ECHR case of Ireland v UK 
(1978) (the ‘hooded men’ case). Internment without trial was introduced on the 9th of August 1971. 
	
14 P. Buckland, The Factory of Grievances. Devolved Government in Northern Ireland 1921-39 (Dublin, Gill & 
Macmillan, 1979). See also Roy Foster, Modern Ireland 1660-1972 (1988). 
15 P. Bew, ‘The Political History of Northern Ireland since Partition: The Prospects for North-South Co-
operation’ Proceedings of the British Academy 98 (1999), 401-418. 
16 See for instance, C. Kennedy-Pipe, The Origins of the Present Troubles in Northern Ireland (Routledge, 
1997) and R. English, Irish Freedom (Macmillan, 2006). 
More than 300 people were interned, many of whom had no connection with the IRA, some of whom 
were mistreated (leading to the ECHR case). On 30 January 1972, fourteen unarmed demonstrators 
were shot and killed by British soldiers during the march that became known as Bloody Sunday. Home 
Rule was suspended shortly afterwards, in March 1972, and Northern Ireland was thereafter ruled 
directly from London until the 1998 Agreement came into force. The ECHR case of Ireland v UK in 
1978 underlined Northern Ireland’s exception status, with respect to derogation from ECHR principles 
in time of ‘war’ (Article 15).17  
 
The overall point that emerges from the above analysis is that rather than cement its status within the 
wider UK, Northern Ireland’s constitutional existence was defined continually in contrast to the 
remainder of the UK. It was the only part of the UK to have what was in effect a written constitution in 
the form of the 1920 Act; and the only part that had a separate democratically elected governmental 
administration possessing the power to rule on a wider range of matters. In this context the UK 
constitution could be described as the ‘normal’ state of affairs; by contrast Northern Ireland’s legal 
status has always been an exception. Nothing that has happened since 1920 has undermined this 
exceptional status – at every stage it has been reinforced, at times even radically, as in the 1998 
Agreement, which built upon earlier attempts at creating a constitutional resolution such as the 
Sunningdale Agreement 1972 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985. 
 
THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT AND THE NEW INSTITUTIONS OF POWER-
SHARING 
 
Looking at the text of the 1998 Agreement one of its most striking aspects is that it attempts to 
accomplish many of the same things that the Government of Ireland Act 1920 aimed to achieve – 
provision for cross-border institutions, and envisaging a united Ireland (this time as fully independent) 
only when that is so wished by a majority on the north side of the border.18 Yet its structures are 
innovative - as Loughlin notes, the 1998 agreement ‘reframed the  entire  structure  of  Northern  Ireland 
government  and,  running  against  the  grain  of  traditional  British  practice,  established a  range  of  
modern  constitutional  techniques  explicitly  designed  to  overcome division  and  to  bolster  trust’.19 
This included the creation of a consociational form of government with respect to the Northern Ireland 
Assembly.20 The Agreement was approved by referendums on both sides of the border. 
 
	
17 Ireland v United Kingdom (1979-80) 2 EHRR 25. 
18 H. Lerner, Making Constitutions in Deeply Divided Societies (CUP, 2011) 
19 M. Loughlin, op cit. 
20 C.  McCrudden,  ‘Northern  Ireland  and  the  British  Constitution  since  the  Belfast  Agreement’  in J.  
Jowell  and  D.  Oliver  (eds),  The  Changing  Constitution  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  6th  edn, 
2007),  227-270. 
On the UK constitutional side, the Northern Ireland Act 1998 was passed by the Westminster 
Parliament, devolving power to the newly created Assembly. The Act also accepts the principle that 
Northern Ireland can leave the UK to reunify with the Republic of Ireland based on majority consent.21 
Section 1 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 states that Northern Ireland can secede from the UK and 
join a united Ireland if the majority of its people agree to this in a referendum (as called for by the 
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland when he/she considers it likely that there is a majority in support 
of such a poll). From the Irish nationalist perspective, 1998 Good Friday/Belfast Agreement represented 
a profound political and legal shift.22  After approval by referendum, the Irish Constitution, enacted in 
1937, was amended in 1998 to remove the outright Irish territorial claim on the entire island and to 
accept the principle that reunification can only happen when majorities on both sides of the border 
accept it. The new text is as follows:  
Article 3 – (1) It is the firm will of the Irish Nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the 
people who share the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and 
traditions, recognising that a united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with 
the consent of a majority of the people, democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions in the 
island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament established by this Constitution shall have 
the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted by the Parliament that existed 
immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution. 
(2) Institutions with executive powers and functions that are shared between those jurisdictions 
may be established by their respective responsible authorities for stated purposes and may 
exercise powers and functions in respect of all or any part of the island.” 
 
Martin Loughlin notes that UK and Irish membership of the EU contributed to the peace settlement 
because it ‘set in place  a  dynamic  scheme  for  devolving  governmental  powers to  its  several  
constituent  nations  and,  perhaps  most  crucially,  it  provides  the supporting  structure  for  the  unique  
cross-border  arrangements  that  brought  about a  peace  settlement  in  Northern  Ireland’.23     
 
Recently tensions over Northern Ireland’s status have re-emerged a result of the Brexit process. For the 
first time in the 21st century the territory’s immediate status within the United Kingdom is being openly 
and seriously questioned by Northern nationalists, and even by many politicians and scholars across the 
rest of Ireland.24 On the Unionist side, the Good Friday Agreement has been called into question both 
	
21 Northern  Ireland  Act  1998,  s.1 
22 J. Coakley and Liam O’Dowd, ‘The transformation of the Irish border’ Political Geography 26 (2007) 877-
885. 
23 M. Loughlin, op cit. 
24 See generally F. O’Toole, Heroic Failure: Brexit and the Politics of Pain (Apollo, 2018); T. Connelly, Brexit 
and Ireland: The Dangers, the Opportunities, and the Inside Story of the Irish Response (Penguin, 2018); R. 
Humphreys, Beyond the Border: The Good Friday Agreement and Irish Unity after Brexit (Merrion Press, 
2018). 
by the DUP and prominent English Tory politicians such as Boris Johnson.25 The prospect of a hard-
border on the island of Ireland has been raised, which would undo much of the political and 
constitutional work of the last two decades (that was, after all, aimed to ameliorate the injustices arising 
from partition while respecting both communities and their traditions). Lost in much of the Brexit debate 
is the fact that much of the 1998 Agreement is presaged on viewing Northern Ireland as an exceptional 
case within the UK i.e. as ‘bi-national’.26 It is, therefore, not an exaggeration to say the 1998 Agreement 
accepted an element of shared sovereignty that the idea of a ‘hard Brexit’ could obliterate. 
 
Brexit and the Irish Border Quandary  
 
With Brexit, the UK seeks to engage in an independent trade policy and negotiate trade deals with non-
EU countries. The UK government under Prime Minister Theresa May also has committed to ending 
the EU principle of free movement of people. The cumulative effect of the exercise of these two ‘red 
lines’ is that the UK aims to exit the customs union and single market, in order to deviate from EU 
rules.  
 
These UK ‘red lines’ are of great importance to the island of Ireland. Exiting the single market and 
customs union will mean that the border between the independent Ireland of 26 counties and the 6 
counties of Northern Ireland will become the only external land border between the EU and the UK. As 
a matter of normal practice, this would necessitate the creation of border infrastructure in order to 
enforce checks on tariffs, regulatory compliance and, potentially, free movement of people. For a 
number of reasons, this poses a serious problem for maintenance of the Northern Ireland peace process, 
and cross-border collaboration between Ireland and Northern Ireland. Yet, the UK has also committed 
to no new infrastructure at the Irish border. It is hard, perhaps impossible, to ‘square the circle’. 
 
In their attempts to find a solution, the EU and UK issued a Joint Report in December 2017 outlining 
three possible solutions to Irish border question: (i) the border issue could be resolved in the framework 
of a future EU-UK trade agreement whereby the UK could, as a starting point, form a customs union 
with the EU; (ii) it could be resolved through specific technical solutions that eliminate the need for 
border infrastructure; (iii) the ‘backstop’ – in the absence of other solutions the UK could commit to 
align itself with EU customs and internal market rules.27 Potentially, there are other options, such as 
	
25 F. O’Grady, ‘Boris Johnson’s sickening comments typify Brexiteers’ approach to Ireland’ The Guardian (28 
February 2018). 
26 B. O’Leary, ‘The Nature of the British-Irish Agreement’ New Left Review I/233 (Jan-Feb 1999). 
27 Joint report from the negotiators of the European Union and the United Kingdom Government on progress 
during phase 1 of negotiations under Article 50 TEU on the United Kingdom's orderly withdrawal from the 
European Union (8 December 2017) -  
https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/joint_report.pdf  
those explored by Nikos Skoutaris in this volume, whereby different parts of the UK could remain in 
the EU while others leave – using Cyprus as a potential model – but these are not discussed in this 
chapter as they are not part of the current negotiations.28 
 
The collapse of the NI Assembly power-sharing operations in early 2017 has meant that there is no 
operational executive capable of showing leadership and, crucially, a willingness to compromise. In the 
current EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement, attention has been focused on ‘the backstop’ which, although 
supported by a clear majority in Northern Ireland (on current polling) is opposed by the DUP and certain 
members of the governing Tory party.29 
 
The Backstop and its controversies 
 
The UK has not brought forward tangible and workable technological solutions to the border question. 
As a result, the ‘backstop’ has emerged as key to the EU-UK Withdrawal Agreement. The backstop 
envisages a hard border on the island of Ireland being avoided via the overarching agreement on the 
future EU-UK trade relationship or via a subsequent agreement to replace the backstop. If the backstop 
were triggered, Northern Ireland would become a Common Regulatory Area (CRA) and would continue 
to abide by EU customs laws and EU legislation concerning the free movement of goods. Northern 
Ireland would be in a unique trading position within the UK. If the rest of the UK – Great Britain – left 
the customs union to seek trade deals elsewhere, NI would remain under the EU customs and regulatory 
umbrella. The advantage to NI of the backstop are: (i) the avoidance of infrastructure at the border and 
(ii) continued participation in the single market for goods, which would benefit NI’s agriculture industry 
and other businesses. The single market relationship between the EU and NI would relate to goods and 
cross-border trade. NI would have to follow relevant EU law and accept the Court of Justice of the 
European Union’s jurisdiction over issues falling within this scope.  
 
Some members of the Conservative Party and the Democratic Unionist Party are concerned that the 
backstop will trap the UK in a permanent customs union – with Northern Ireland additionally effectively 
remaining in the Single Market. At time of writing, this is a key stumbling block to MPs approving a 
Brexit deal. At present there are efforts by the British government to reopen the legally-binding 
Withdrawal Agreement to remove the backstop, but this seems unlikely. 
 
	
28 See N. Skoutaris, ‘Brexit and transitional justice: Brexit as a challenge to peacebuilding’ (this volume), as 
well as N. Skoutaris, ‘Territorial Differentiation in EU Law: Can Scotland and Northern Ireland Remain in the 
EU and/or the single market? Cambridge Yearbook of European Studies (2017), 1-24. 
29 ‘DUP confirms to vote against Brexit deal and 'toxic' backstop’ Reuters (15 January 2019). 
Ultimately, the possibility that a ‘no deal’ Brexit will occur in April or in May 2019 will necessitate the 
construction of customs infrastructure along or close to the Irish border, as the UK will suddenly become 
a third country under EU law and checks would be required on goods. Whether such infrastructure 
would be set up by the Irish government, per EU instructions, or by the UK government on the Northern 
side, is uncertain. However, the setting up of such infrastructure is likely to exacerbate political and 
sectarian tensions within Northern Ireland, making the reconstituting of the Northern Ireland Assembly 
less and less likely. In time, and with demographic changes on the horizon in Northern Ireland that 
favour Irish nationalists, and continued support for the EU being a majority view across NI, the 
likelihood of a ‘border poll’ can only increase. Prior to the Brexit referendum it did not appear likely 
that Irish reunification would come to be an active issue in British and Irish politics during the next 
decade. Brexit has re-opened old wounds and increased the likelihood that it will occur. Time is moving 
faster than expected on this issue. The next years may see a constitutional resolution, either via an 
eventual soft Brexit or via a hard or no deal Brexit, and a referendum on Irish reunification. As with 
partition, reunification would be a question of justice/injustice – with nationalists and unionists having 
different conceptions of what is just and unjust in the circumstances. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The ongoing Brexit process has profound consequences for Northern Ireland within the constitution of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. Given the overriding importance of the 
‘Irish border’ to the Brexit negotiations, this paper examined the historical and constitutional 
circumstances that led to partition of Ireland in the first place. It considered the injustices that occurred 
during the ‘Troubles’ era, and the apparent resolution of these questions of justice/injustice, via 
constitutional means, with the Good Friday/Belfast Agreement of 1998. Finally, it considered how the 
Brexit process has reopened apparently settled questions on the constitutional status of Northern Ireland, 
such as the viability of the post-1998 power-sharing institutions and the issue of whether a referendum 
on reunification with a united Ireland should be called. The question of what, for each community, is 
just and unjust regarding the border between Ireland and Northern Ireland remains an open one in the 
post-Brexit environment. 
 
 
 
